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RECENT DECISIONS
Nevertheless, a relevant market must be determined. It is
important to note that the Court mentioned such factors as inter-
changeability and cross-elasticity, but also ruled that submarkets
were appropriate "lines of commerce." Furthermore, the concept
of the geographic market was a flexible one consisting first of the
nation as a whole, and then of cities with populations of ten
thousand or over.
The standard of illegality was also flexible, for in assessing
the effect of the vertical aspects, the Court felt that the share
of the market foreclosed "will seldom be determinative." 40 Yet
in assessing the effects of the horizontal aspects it was stated that
"the market share which companies may control . . . is one of the
most important factors to be considered ... " 50
Application of Brown Shoe to mergers between small com-
panies in industries in which there is competition may have harm-
ful effects. It may be that size and strength are necessary for
corporations to survive in some industries.5 ' A strict application
may prevent this development.
Whether or not Brown Shoe has brought a degree of stability
to antitrust litigation is clearly open to question. It cannot even
be stated with certainty that Standard Oil's quantitative standard
has been laid to rest. However, one aspect of the decision is
apparent. In the hands of one who fears that business concentra-
tion is unhealthy, Brown Shoe can be a most effective weapon.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - EViDEqcE - POST-ARRAIGNMENT IN-
CRIMINATORY STATEMENTS HELD INADMISSIBLE WHERE DEFEND-
ANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS NOT OBSERVED. - Defendant was
arraigned on charges of first degree robbery, second degree assault
and petit larceny. After arraignment and before indictment, de-
fendant in the absence of counsel- whose presence he had not
requested- made certain voluntary, unsolicited, inculpatory state-
ments to the arresting officer. These statements were received
into evidence at trial over defendant's objection. The Appellate
Division reversed the conviction and the Court of Appeals, in a
4-3 decision, affirming the reversal, held that "any statement made
by an accused after arraignment not in the presence of counsel . . .
is inadmissible." People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 165, 182 N.E.2d
103, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429 (1962).
49 Id. at 328.
50 Id. at 343.
51 See Business Week, June 30, 1962, p. 160.
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The New York approach to the admissibility of incriminating
statements obtained through police interrogation has been to de-
termine whether they were a product of coercion and therefore
involuntary.'
An involuntary statement obtained through coercion was con-
sidered unreliable and therefore inadmissible. 2  This voluntariness
test when considered in the light of due process took on a second
reason for excluding an involuntary statement- that it had been
obtained through illegal methods.3
Within the last five years, the New York Court of Appeals
has been in the process of formulating a new approach to the
problems raised by coerced statements. This approach took root
in the case of People v. Spano.4 While the majority opinion in
that case relied on the voluntariness test as expanded by due
process,5 the dissent sought to resolve the issue of admissibility
on the basis of the post-indictment status of the defendant. They
reasoned that once an indictment is returned against a defendant,
his accused status requires the enforcement of his constitutional
rights: "to have the advice of a lawyer at every stage of a court
proceeding, and the right not to be forced to testify against one-
self during such proceeding." 6
The Spano case represents a pivotal point in the development
of New York law in this area, since the rationale of the dissent was
3 This was the test at common law. People v. Chapleau, 121 N.Y. 266,
274, 24 N.E. 469, 471 (1890). New York utilized the common-law rule in§ 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: "A confession of a defendant,
whether in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person, can
be given in evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear
produced by threats, or unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney,
that he shall not be prosecuted therefor. . . ." This seems to apply to
admissions as well as confessions. People v. Reilly, 181 App. Div. 522, 169
N.Y. Supp. 119 (1st Dep't), aff'd on other grounds, 224 N.Y. 90, 120 N.E.
113 (1918). Contra, Slough, Confessions and Admissions, 28 FORDHAm L.
REV. 96, 103-04 (1959).
2People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 384 (1857). In a more recent case the
court said, "an involuntary 'confession', is, by its very nature, evidence of
nothing." People v. Valletutti, 297 N.Y. 226, 231, 78 N.E.2d 485, 487
(1948). See Marx, Psychosomatics and Coerced Confessions, 57 DICK. L.
REV. 1 (1952).
3 People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951); see Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
44 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1958), rev'd, 360
U.S. 315 (1959) (defendant induced to make post-indictment incriminatory
statements by deception of friend in police force).
5 Ibid.6 1d. at 266, 150 N.E.2d at 231, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 801. See N.Y. CoNsT.
art. I, § 6 (guarantee of right to counsel at trial); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoC.
§ 188 (must be informed of his right to counsel when brought before a




subsequently applied by the majority of the court in the case of
People v. Di Biasi.7  In that case defendant had been indicted for
murder in the first degree and after indictment had surrendered
to the police, either in the company of his attorney or by prior
arrangement of his attorney. Certain damaging admissions were
elicited from the defendant during an interrogation period in the
assistant district attorney's office in the absence of his counsel.
At no time had defendant requested the presence of his counsel.
The court held this to be a denial of- his constitutional rights and
reversed the conviction." In the case of People v. Downs, the
court affirmed a conviction where incriminatory statements obtained
after indictment were received into evidence. However, in that
case, the essence of the post-indictment statements had been re-
iterated by the defendant at trial. This was not a retreat from the
Di Bxiasi case as was later pointed out in the case of People v.
Waterman,10 which involved a conviction for a noncapital offense.
Here the court unequivocally applied the Di Biasi rationale where
defendant had not retained counsel and had made an incriminatory
77 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
8 The majority opinion relied heavily on the concurring opinions of the
Supreme Court in Spano stating: "In view of what happened in the
Supreme Court we do not think we are concluded by this court's decision
in Spato." People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 550, 166 N.E2d 825, 828,
200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 25 (1960).
Two significant occurrences took place in the time span between the
dissent in Spano and the majority opinion in Di Biasi: (1) On appeal to
the Supreme Court there were two concurring opinions, one by Mr. Justice
Douglas (in which Black and Brennan, JJ., joined), and the other by Mr.
Justice Stewart (in which Douglas and Brennan, JJ., joined), which had
approached the post-indictment statements in Spano on the same basis as did
the dissent on the New York Court of Appeals. "This is a case of an
accused, who is scheduled to be tried by a judge and jury, being tried
in a preliminary way by the police. This is a kangaroo court procedure
whereby the police produce the vital evidence in the form of a confession
which is useful or necessary to obtain a conviction. They in effect deny
him effective representation of counsel." Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
325 (1959) (concurring opinion of Douglas, J.). (2) There was a shift in
the makeup of the Court of Appeals. Chief Judge Conway who had taken
part in the majority opinion in Spano, stepped down from the court and
was replaced by Judge Foster who with the three dissenting judges in
Spait (Desmond, Fuld and Van Voorhis, JJ.) formed the majority in
Di Biasi.
9 8 N.Y.2d 861, 168 N.E.2d 711, 203 N.Y.S.2d 908, cert. denied, 364 U.S.
867 (1960) (defendant made voluntary unsolicited confession in post-indict-
ment situation).
109 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961). In reference
to the opinion in Downr, the court stated: "Our affirmance in People v.
Downs . . . upon which the People rely, represents no departure from the
principle laid down in Di Biasi." Id. at 567, 175 N.E.2d at 448, 216 N.Y.S.2d
at 76.
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statement in a post-indictment setting.1' The court once again
emphasized the effect of an indictment and stated that "the initiation
of a criminal action against the accused by the finding of an indict-
ment operates to impose certain disabilities upon the People." 12
The disabilities imposed were that there could be no infringement
of defendant's right to counsel and his protection from self-
incrimination. "Any secret interrogation" at this point would con-
stitute violation of these rights where defendant's counsel was not
present and he had not been apprised of these rights.'3 Thus the
Court of Appeals had excluded the voluntariness test in the post-
indictment situation where defendant's constitutional rights had not
been enforced.
The position represented by the Di Biasi and Waterman cases
goes beyond the requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 4
The Supreme Court has refused to deal with the issue raised in
these cases on the same basis 1, and has resolved the cases solely
on the basis of the voluntariness test as expanded by the concept
of due process.1 6 There is, however, a minority on that Court
11 In referring to Di Biasi, the court stated that: "The crucial consider-
ation was, rather, that the interrogation to which he was subjected, since
it came after indictment, was an impermissible step in the progress of a
criminal cause against the defendant." Id. at 565, 175 N.E2d at 447, 216
N.Y.S.2d at 74.
12 Id. at 566, 175 N.E.2d at 448, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
13 Ibid.
14 As has been stated, due process requires that the incriminatory statement
be voluntary and not obtained through illegal means. "The abhorrence of
society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their
inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that
the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end
life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to
convict those thought to be criminals as from actual criminals themselves."
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
15 "We find it unnecessary to reach that contention, for we find use of
the confession obtained here inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment
under traditional principles." Id. at 320.
Where the same issue has been raised where confessions were obtained
prior to arraignment, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize it because
of public policy considerations: "[Wihere an event has occurred while the
accused was without his counsel which fairly promises to adversely affect
his chances, the doctrine suggested by petitioner would have a lesser but still
devastating effect on enforcement of criminal law, for it would effectively
preclude police questioning-fair as well as unfair-until the accused was
afforded opportunity to call his attorney." Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433, 441 (1958) ; Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
Denial of counsel during pre-arraignment period has bearing on the
issue of voluntariness. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
16 This test is used regardless of the point reached before trial. Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (pre-arraignment) ; Spano v. New York,




which has consistently upheld the rationale as presented in Di Biasi
and Waterman and has sought to impose it upon the states as a
requirement of due process.17
The majority of the Court in the principal case applied the
Di Biasi - Waterman rationale to a voluntary and unsolicited post-
arraignment statement which had been made in the absence of
counsel. "In reason and logic the admissibility into evidence of a
post-arraignment statement should not be treated any differently
than a post-indictment statement." 18 The Court reasoned that an
arraignment after arrest was "the first stage of a criminal pro-
ceeding" 19 and thereby entitled defendant to have his right to
counsel and protection from self-incrimination enforced. Nor was
defendant estopped from objecting to receipt of such statements
into evidence because he had made no request for counsel when
informed of his rights.
The dissent, on the other hand, took issue with the majority
position on the following grounds. First, it was contended that
when there was no question as to the voluntary nature of the
statement, which had been made for defendant's own benefit., there
should be no reason for excluding it as evidence. 20 Secondly, the
dissent considered that there was a basic distinction between an
arraignment before indictment which was aimed at determining
whether there was "suffcient cause to believe the defendant guilty" 21
and an indictment which "imports that the People have legally
sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction."22  The contention
here was that the defendant did not become an accused until after
the return of an indictment and thus was not entitled to the
constitutional protection sought. Thirdly, it was felt: "To hold
that admission of a defendant's statement under the particular cir-
As has been recently enumerated, the elements considered on the issue of
voluntariness are: (1) extensive cross-questioning; (2) undue delay in ar-
raignment; (3) failure to advise prisoner of his rights; (4) refusal to permit
contact with his lawyer; (5) duration and condition of detention; (6)
manifest attitude of police toward defendant; (7) defendant's physical and
mental state; (8) the various pressures applied which seek to destroy his
resistance and self-control. Culombe v. Connecticut, mtpra at 601-02.
17 See Culombe v. Connecticut, supra note 16, at 637. (concurring opinion);
Spano v. New York, supra note 14, at 325 (concurring opinion); Crooker v.California, sulra note 15, at 441 (dissenting opinion); Cicenia v. Lagay,
supra note 15, at 511 (dissenting opinion) ; Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426,
431 (1958) (dissenting opinion).18 People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 164, 182 N.E.2d 103, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d
427, 428 (1962).19 Ibid. See N.Y. CoDE CRIb. PROC. §§ 165, 188, 208.
20 People v. Meyer, supra note 18, at 166, 182 N.E.2d at 105, 227 N.Y.S.2d
at 430.
21 Ibid. See N.Y. CODE CRIMt. PROC. § 207.
22 People v. Meyer, supra note 18, at 166, 182 N.E.2d at 105, 227 N.Y.S.2d
at 430. See N.Y. CODE CRiE. PROC. § 208.
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cumstances of this case reversible error will not serve the ad-
ministration of justice." 23
The principal case, by extending the Di Biasi - Waterman
rationale to the post-arraignment situation, has precluded the pos-
sibility of "any secret interrogation" from the point of arraignment
on. Not only has this decision gone beyond the requirements of
the fourteenth amendment,24 but also adopts a rationale which
has not been favorably passed on by the federal courts where the
issue has been raised in relation to their own rules of admissibility.23
The decision gives rise to certain practical considerations. There
can be no doubt that many will view the decision as "hand-
cuffing" the police and thereby frustrating the social need for having
the guilty brought to justice. 26 On the other hand, others will
acclaim the decision as being consonant with the basic dictates of
23 People v. Meyer, supra note 18, at 167, 182 N.E.2d at 105, 227 N.Y.S.2d
at 430.
24 See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
25 "On the other hand, the rationales offered here for right to counsel
are essentially prophylactic: that his presence and advice would guard
defendant against making incriminatory statements and would prevent police
distortion and misrepresentation of what occurs at such interrogation. Al-
though the latter argument has weighty support in Supreme Court dissenting
opinions, it has not yet commended itself to a majority of the court, nor
has the former argument." United States v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905,
921 (D.D.C. 1961). See Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir.
1960) ; Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Moreland
v. United States, 270 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1959).26 There seem to be three different reasons for not adopting an in-
flexible rule for declaring confessions obtained through police questioning
inadmissible.
One has a psychological basis: "Moreover, and more important, every
guilty person is almost always ready and desirous to confess, as he is
detected and arrested. . . . The nervous pressure of guilt is enormous;
the load of the deed done is heavy; the fear of detection fills the con-
sciousness; and when detection comes, the pressure is relieved; and the
deep sense of, relief makes confession a satisfaction. At that moment
he will tell all, and tell it truly. To forbid soliciting him, to seek to prevent
this relief, is to fly in the face of human nature. It is natural, and should
be lawful, to take his confession at that moment-the best one." 3 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §851, at 319 (3d ed. 1940). It would seem that Professor Wig-
more's comment would be applicable at any time during police interrogation
regardless of whether it was a post-arraigument or pre-arraignment situation.
Another argument revolves around the practical considerations of police
interrogation and its purposes. See Inbau, Law and Police Practice:
Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U.
L. REv. 77 (1957); PUTTAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 72-78
(1953).
The third is that by demanding the presence of a lawyer, the investigatory
process is completely frustrated: "As soon as a lawyer is introduced on the
scene, he advises his client to answer no questions. Thus if a lawyer were
admitted the whole proceeding would be stultified." Williams, Questioning




our democratic way of life.2 7  Regardless of the view taken it
is certain that, by demanding the presence of counsel from the point
of arraignment on, the New York Court of Appeals has sought
to assure, with as much judicial certainty as possible, that state-
ments obtained after arraignment are in fact voluntary.28
There seems to be no reason to expect that the practical
effects of the Meyer case will be felt only in the post-arraignment
area. This is prompted by the realization that the Meyer decision
will exert pressure on the police and district attorneys to obtain
whatever information they would have ordinarily sought after ar-
raignment in the period from arrest to arraignment. Thus it
would seem that the same problem which the Court of Appeals
sought to correct in the post-arraignment situation, would present
itself in the pre-arraignment period. In that event, the Court of
Appeals would seem to have three alternatives with which to cope
with the problem: (1) to retain the voluntariness test; (2) to
extend the Meyer-Di Biasi rationale to the moment of arrest;
or (3) to enforce the prompt arraignment statute 29 utilizing the
McNabb- Mallory 30 rationale with which the federal courts in-
terpret prompt arraignment,31 i. e., an unnecessary delay in. arraign-
ment would make incriminating statements obtained therein in-
admissible. Presently, the court still utilizes the voluntariness test
27 The proponents of this position argue that defendant's representation
by counsel at the earliest stage possible would be the best guarantee of his
rights. "A person accused of crime needs a lawyer right after his arrest
probably more than at any other time." 1 CHAFEE, FUNDAMENTAL Hu AX
RIGHTS 541 (1951). See Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The
Right to Counsel And To Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYx L. REv.
24, 60-68 (1961); Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YoRIC & NAT'L
LEGAL Am & D FNDER Ass'x, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE AccusED 60 (1959).
For a history of the right to counsel in the United States on both the federal
and state level, see BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AmuCAN COURTS
(1955).
28 In a recent Appellate Division case the court distinguished a post-
arraignment situation from Meyer. People v. Berry, - App. Div. 2d -,
228 N.Y.S.2d 34, 35 (2d Dep't 1962) (conviction was affirmed because there
had been no objection to admission of the statements at trial).2 9 N.Y. CoE CIM. PROC. § 165.
3 0 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
31 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 (a) : "An officer making an arrest under a warrant
issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant
shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest
available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to com-
mit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States."
As was stated in McNabb, which put teeth into the concept, its purpose
"checks resort to those reprehensible practices known as the 'third degree'
which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still find their way into
use. It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of
persons accused of crime." McNabb v. United States, supra note 30, at
344.
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from the point of arrest to arraignment. 32  There is, however, some
basis for suggesting that the court might resort to the McNabb-
Mallory rationale.33 Section 165 of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure requires: "The defendant must in all cases be taken
before the magistrate without unnecessary delay. . . ." At the
present time an unnecessary delay in arraignment has bearing only
on the question of voluntariness as applied to the period from
arrest to arraignment. 34  By enforcing the prompt arraignment
statute, the court could effectively obtain the same results which
it has sought to obtain by utilizing the Meyer- Di Biasi rationale
in the period after arraignment. 35 As contrasted to the application
of the Meyer- Di Biasi rationale from arrest to arraignment, the
McNabb-Mallory reasoning commends itself on two grounds:
(1) it has been tested by the federal courts with a certain amount
of success; 36 and (2) it does not exclude all incriminatory state-
ments obtained from arrest to arraignment as would Meyer where
counsel was not present.37
The extension of the Di Biasi - Waterman rationale in Meyer
falls within the logical development of the trend from its roots in
Spano. Logically the underlying rationale of Meyer could only
have been successfully contended with at the Di Biasi point of
development. The next logical step would seem to be to extend
it further to the period from arrest to arraignment. Yet at this
juncture, experience suggests that the court should not adopt such
an inflexible rule which would operate to frustrate any and all
types of police questioning and thereby defeat the social need
which prompts such investigation.
32See, e.g., People v. Everett, 10 N.Y.2d 500, 180 N.E.2d 556, 225
N.Y.S.2d 193, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 963 (1962); People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d
347, 179 N.E.2d 339, 223 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1961).
33 See, e.g., People v. Everett, supra note 32, at 510, 180 N.E.2d at 561,
225 N.Y.S.2d at 200 (1962) (concurring opinion) ; People v. Lane, supra note
32, at 354, 179 N.E.2d at 341, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 200 (1961) (concurring
opinion).
34 See note 32 supra.
35 See note 31 supra.
36 It has provided an incentive to the development of more sophisticated
technical means of crime detection thus eliminating the need for "third
degree" methods either physical or mental. "Technical crime-detection
methods have greatly reduced arbitrary intrusions on civil liberties." J. Edgar
Hoover, quoted in FRANK & FRANic, NOT GUILTY 185 (1957).
37 The McNabb-Mallory rationale does not exclude confessions merely
because obtained by police. "The mere fact that a confession was made while
in the custody of the police does not render it inadmissible." McNabb v.
United States, supra note 30, at 346. It does not exclude statements made
immediately upon arrest. See, e.g., Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915
(D.C. Cir. 1959); Metoyer v. United States, 250 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
It does not exclude statements made prior to period of illegal detention. See
United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1044).
